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Abstract 
In this paper we study the effect of intra-industry trade in an environmental-quality differentiated 
good on the pollution level in  a two-country framework when there are strategic interactions 
between the firms in the two countries.  The pro-competitive effect of intra-industry trade 
expands the scale of production and, therefore, increases pollution in both the countries. Effect on 
the strategic choice of environmental qualities of the good is, on the other hand, asymmetric for 
the two producers. Impact of environmental policies like pollution content production tax and 
tariff on trade and pollution levels are also studied. .  
 1 Introduction 
 
Linkages between trade and environment and effect of environmental policies on trade 
have been widely discussed in the last two decades. Copeland and Taylor (1994, 2003, 
2004) discuss in great detail the various linkages between trade and environment and 
show how income differences and sometimes environmental policies affect the trade 
flows. The possible impact of trade liberalization on pollution levels have also been 
analysed by a host of economists, Low and Yeats (1992), Dean (1992, 1999) and 
Copeland and Taylor (1999) to name a few. 
 
Trade liberalization generally affects the environment in three ways. Increased trade leads 
to a greater scale of economic activity that increases the production of all goods and 
services, including pollution-intensive goods, and therefore, degrades the environment. 
This is the scale effect, which gives us a negative relation between trade liberalisation and 
the environment. However, production techniques also change with trade liberalization 
and a subsequent increase in real income. The increased real income causes an increase in 
the demand for better environmental quality and firms opt for cleaner techniques of 
production. If investment liberalization also takes place, foreign investment may bring 
modern technologies which are likely to be cleaner than older versions. This positive 
technique effect works against the scale effect and Copeland and Taylor (2003) show that 
the relative strength of these two effects depends on how government policy is formed 
and how quickly it changes to new conditions. In addition to the scale and the technique 
effects, there is a change in the relative size of the economic sectors following a reduction 
in trade barriers. Trade liberalisation changes the relative prices between goods produced 
in different sectors, so that producers and consumers face a new trade-off. This is the 
composition effect, which tends to increase pollution in the country which has a 
comparative advantage in dirtier goods and lower the same in the country which has a 
comparative advantage in cleaner goods, with such advantages emanating from 
fundamental sources like factor endowments, technology and tastes.  
 
In this paper I examine the impact of trade on local pollution levels in a somewhat 
different context. None of the above discussions have considered the possibility of intra-
industry trade in dirty goods, or the possibility that the degree of dirtiness of the same 
good can be different depending on the technology used in its production.  To 
demonstrate this, I first consider a single consumption good which can vary in its 
environmental quality leading to different levels of environmental degradation. This 
environmental quality is a choice variable for the producing firms. Second, the strategic 
interactions between home and foreign firms after opening up of trade in terms of their 
choices of both the environmental qualities and output levels are considered.  More 
precisely, I consider an extended reciprocal dumping model of intra-industry trade a la 
Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983). 
 
There is one firm in each country and the firms produce a single environmental-quality 
differentiated dirty good. The environmental quality, which is observable to all, is judged 
by the extent of pollution it generates and a good of a better environmental quality is a 
cleaner good. In autarky, the firms are non-discriminating monopolists in their respective 
countries. Post trade, the firms play a two-stage game in each country. In the first stage 
they choose their abatement technology, which determines the environmental-quality of 
their product, and incur a sunk cost. It is assumed that a cleaner good can only be 
produced with a better abatement technology, which can be obtained at a greater sunk 
cost. In the second stage they choose their level of output. In this framework, the strategic 
effects of the opening up of trade changes the environmental qualities as well as output 
levels to be sold in the two countries. The pollution levels are, therefore, affected due to 
such changes in the environmental quality and total supplies. This paper shows that while 
scale of production increases after trade liberalization in both countries, increasing the 
pollution levels through the scale effect, the environmental quality of the dirty good 
improves in one country while it falls in the other. Thus, the technique effect actually 
increases the level of pollution in one of the countries. Since I have considered a partial 
equilibrium framework where only the market for the dirty good is considered, it has not 
been possible for me to show how the composition effect works in changing pollution 
levels after trade liberalization. An imposition of a pollution content production tax 
increases the exports and lowers imports of the country imposing the tax. While a tax 
imposed by the country producing the lower-quality good always lowers the pollution in 
the other country, in all other cases, that is the impact of tax by country producing higher 
quality on the pollution levels in both countries and the tax in the low-quality country on 
the pollution there, depends on the relative importance of the scale and technique effects. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model under autarky, 
while in sections 3 and 4 we analyse the effects of trade liberalisation on the environment 
and the effects of environmental policies like pollution content production taxes and 
tariffs on the volume of trade and pollution levels respectively. Finally in section 6 we 
conclude the paper.  
 
 
2. The Model under Autarky 
 
Consider two countries, labelled 1 and 2, with one firm in each country. These firms 
produce an environmental-quality differentiated good X, which generates pollution 
during production. The quality of X is indexed by ],0[ AA  with A  being the quality of 
the cleanest good that can be produced by the present state of technology. A cleaner 
variety of X (higher A) uses a more sophisticated cleansing technology and generates less 
local pollution per unit of production. The total pollution generated by this industry thus, 
depends on the quality of the good being produced and the volume of production. Such 
characterisation of environmental-quality as an attribute of the good has been done 
previously in Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) and Sen and Acharyya (2012).  
 
In order to capture the scale effect, we consider here a continuum of consumers, with the 
scale of production depending on the market coverage. We assume that each consumer 
buys, if at all, only one unit of X and the scale of production vary with the size of the 
market covered by the firms. The consumers have identical incomes but different tastes. 
The utility function is specified as: 
                        
buy.t don' they if           0    
 pAU 
  ;         (1) 
In country j, the taste parameter   is uniformly distributed with unit density and
],0[ j  .  
 
In autarky, the firms enjoy a monopoly in their own country. Suppose that the two firms 
have identical cost structures. The cost of quality improvement, in this case the 
investment in abatement technology, is incurred before the actual production and thus, 
the environmental-quality level is chosen before the production process starts. The cost of 
quality can, thus, be regarded as a sunk cost. We assume for the sake of simplicity, that 
there are no further costs of production. Since every environmental quality is associated 
with a different technology which involves a sunk cost, we assume that the monopolist is 
non-discriminatory and offers a single environmental quality. Since the firms in the two 
countries have identical cost structures and the consumers have identical taste patterns, an 
analysis of the equilibrium choice of output and environmental-quality provided by the 
firm in one country will suffice. 
 
The consumers in each country have to decide whether to buy the good X or not. A 
consumer with a taste parameter   will buy if he derives at least his reservation utility, 
which in this case is zero, from consuming the good. That is, he will buy if 
0  pAU    (2) 
The consumers in country j who are indifferent between buying the good and not buying 
at all have a taste parameter 
j
~
   such that jjjjjj ApeipA /
~
   . .  .0
~
  , where    is 
the environmental-quality offered in the jth country. Thus, the consumers who have a 
taste parameter j
~
 do not buy X at all and the amount of X that is demanded equals: 
  )/(~ jjjjjj Apq           (3) 
Under autarky, each firm, being a monopolist in his own country, will take his decisions 
in two stages. In the first stage, he sets up the plant and has to choose the abatement 
technology and thus, the environmental quality of his product. The investment on 
abatement technology is made in this stage and depends on the environmental-quality of 
X that is to be produced, say 2/2jA . This abatement technology cannot be changed in the 
short run. In the second stage he chooses the price he will charge, given the demand. 
Thus, in the second stage, he will maximize profits, for a given level of environmental 
quality where profits are  
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Setting 0/  jj p , we get,  
  )5.0( jj
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and j
a
jq )5.0(            (5b) 
where  
a
j
a
j qp  and    are the price & quality levels in autarky. 
In the first stage, the monopolist chooses A by maximizing 2/
2
jjj A  . Setting 
0/  jj A , we get,   
  
2)25.0( j
a
jA        (5c) 
It is immediate that the price, output and the environmental-quality under autarky 
depends on the maximum taste parameter j  and hence, the size of the market in each 
country. Therefore, 
 
Proposition 1: Under autarky, the firm in Country j will offer a higher environmental-
quality, charge a higher price and produce more than the firm in Country k if the market 
size in Country j is larger than in Country k. That is, if kj   . 
 
Proof: Under uniform distribution with unit density, the market size or the total number 
of consumers in Country j equals  
 jjN   
Thus,  
3)125.0( j
a
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Thus from (5b) through (5d) it is immediate that,  
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Hence the claim.
    
 
The local pollution in a country increases when a firm increases the level of production 
(scale effect) and falls with an improvement in the environmental quality of its product by 
the adoption of abatement technology (technique effect).  Thus, the local pollution in the 
ith country is expressed as: 
 0    , 0    ;)  jj
a
jjj
a
jjj ALqL ,A(qLL        (6) 
 
However, in the rest of our analysis in this paper, we will assume that country sizes are 
identical. That is, kj   . This will enable us to isolate the effect of trade liberalization 
induced competition between firms on the level of pollution from the effect of country 
sizes on these variables. Note, that under such an assumption, the two firms will supply 
identical qualities in the two countries under autarky. Given such assumption, which 
essentially means that we assume identical set of heterogeneous consumers in the two 
countries, the price, environmental-quality and quantity choices would be the same in the 
two countries resulting in the same level of local pollution.   
 
3. The Effect of Trade Liberalization  
 
When the countries liberalise trade, the firms have access to the markets in both the 
countries and will compete with each other for market share in each market. Suppose 
there is no transport cost. As we assume no inter-country disparity with regard to either 
consumers or the production cost of the firms, trade liberalization and market integration 
will simply mean an expansion of the market size for each firm. As there are two firms 
competing in each country, now, it is no longer profitable for them to continue offering 
identical environmental-qualities. We assume that after deciding on the environmental-
quality in the first stage, the firms choose quantities. That is, we assume Cournot 
competition between firms in the second stage. In this case, the profits are not driven to 
zero even if they continue to offer the same (and identical) environmental-qualities as 
they were offering under autarky. But similar to what was demonstrated by Motta (1993) 
in the context of endogenous quality choice, we will show that the firms will now offer 
two distinct qualities to relax competition between them. 
 
Let the firm in Country 1, labelled firm 1, produce a higher environmental-quality jA1  
than the other firm, firm 2, producing jA2  for the market in Country j. The consumers 
now have to make two decisions. First they decide, as in autarky, whether to buy or not. 
Second, when faced with the alternative environmental qualities provided by the two 
firms, they have to choose among them.  
 
Let ijp  be the price of the environmental-quality offered by firm i to consumers of 
country j, (i, j = 1,2). Though a consumer is willing to pay more for a variety of higher 
environmental-quality, he will actually purchase the good of quality jA1  from firm 1 
instead of quality jA2  from firm 2, )( 21 jj AA  , if ‘net’ utility from jA1  is at least as 
large as that from jA2  : 
 jjjj pApA 2211    `      (7) 
In both these decisions, that of market participation and selection of environmental 
quality, it is assumed that the consumer indifferent between purchasing or not actually 
purchases, and the one indifferent between the qualities jA1  and jA2  selects the higher 
quality jA1 .   
 
The consumers in Country j who are indifferent between buying the lower quality good 
and not buying at all have a taste parameter 
2  such that 
jjjj ApeipA 222222 /.  .  .0   . Again, the consumers who are indifferent between 
buying jA1  at jp1  and jA2  at jp2 have a taste parameter 1  such that 
jjjj pApA 221111   . So, )/()( 21211 jjjj AApp  . Thus, the consumers who 
have a taste parameter 2  do not buy X at all, those with   such that 12   buy 
the low quality good jA2  from the firm 2 while those with 1   buy the high quality 
good jA1  from the firm 1. The amount of X that is demanded in Country j of the two 
firms is then, 
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where ijq  is the quantity of X demanded by the consumers of the jth country from the ith 
firm. The inverse demand functions can be written from equations (8a) and (8b) as  
 jjjjjj AqAqAp 221111                                                                               (9a) 
 jjjj Aqqp 2212 )(                                                                                      (9b) 
The firms play a two-stage game. In stage 1, they decide on the quality level to be offered 
in each country. In this stage, they incur a sunk cost on environmental-quality as in 
autarky. In the second stage, they choose the quantities to be produced. The equilibrium 
choice of quality levels and quantities by the firms can be derived by backward induction 
of the above game.  
 
In Stage 2, the firms maximize 
j
ijiji qp . Setting 0 iji q , we get,  
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Note that the first-order conditions (10a) and (10c) and (10b) and (10d) form pairs of 
independent and symmetric subsystems. This has two implications. First, the output and 
price choice of each firm in one market is independent of those in the other market. These 
choices depend only on the environmental-quality selected by the two firms for that 
particular market (or country). This result follows from the “segmented market” property 
due to sunk cost of quality development and zero production cost. Second, the output and 
price choices made by each firm are the same for the two markets. This result follows 
from the “symmetric market” property under the assumption of identical set of consumers 
in the two markets. Market segmentation and symmetric properties were first 
demonstrated by Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) in a strategic trade 
model. The same results hold in our case of (strategic) trade in environmental-quality in 
differentiated goods. The following Lemma formalizes these results. 
 
Lemma 1: Nash equilibrium pairs of quantities and corresponding prices in country-i are 
independent of those in country-j.  
 
Proof: Using the first-order conditions (10a) and (10c) for country 1, we obtain the Nash 
equilibrium pair of quantities and corresponding (market clearing) prices as: 
Solving the equations, we get, 
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Similarly, from (10b) and (10d) we obtain, 
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Thus,  *21*11*21*11 ,,, ppqq  depend only on the environmental qualities offered by the two 
firms in country 1, *21
*
11  and AA  while  *22*12*22*12 ,,, ppqq  depend on the environmental 
qualities offered in country 2, *22
*
12  and AA . Hence the claim.
 
  
 
Given these choices of quantities, we now look for the Nash equilibrium qualities in the 
first stage. While choosing ijA , firm-i incurs the sunk cost 2/
2
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22 iiii Aqp  , which are the profits of 
firm-i from domestic sales and exports. From the profit maximization conditions, one can 
say that 
 
Lemma 2: The Nash equilibrium pair of environmental-quality in one market is 
independent of that in the other. 
 
Proof: As shown in Appendix A, maximization of profits   
j
ijijiji Aqp 2/
2**  by 
choosing the environmental qualities 21  and ii AA by firm i, (i = 1,2) leads to the following 
set of  first order conditions: 
 0
)4(
)28)(2(
113
2111
2
212111
2
112111
2



A
AA
AAAAAA
     (12a) 
 0
)4(
)28)(2(
123
2212
2
222212
2
122212
2



A
AA
AAAAAA
    (12b) 
 0
)4(
)4(
213
2111
2111
2
11
2



A
AA
AAA
    (12c) 
 0
)4(
)4(
223
2212
2212
2
12
2



A
AA
AAA
    (12d) 
Equations (12a) and (12c) are the reaction functions of the two firms in environmental-
quality in country 1 while (12b) and (12d) are their reaction functions in country 2. It is 
evident that the pair of reaction functions represented by (12a) and (12c) solve for 
2111  and AA  independently of the pair (12b) and (12d). Similarly, the environmental 
qualities offered by the two firms in Country 2, 2212  and AA , can be obtained from (12b) 
and (12d) without any reference to the other pair of reaction functions.  
Hence the result.        
 Once again this result reflects the segmentation property of the model due to the cost 
structure. This independence result has some far reaching implications for unilateral 
regulatory policies, as we will see later. 
 
Let ),2,1,( ,
* jiAij denote the Nash equilibrium quality levels chosen by the two firms 
under free trade. The values of A can be calculated from the equation pairs by setting 
.1for  ,21   jj AA  As shown in the Appendix A, the relevant solution of 7924.2 , 
which when substituted in the reaction functions yield the Nash equilibrium 
environmental-quality levels as, 
1
 
  2519.0 2*12
*
11  AA     (13a) 
and 2*22
*
21 0902.0  AA     (13b) 
The solution is shown in Figure 1. The curve labelled )( 21 jAR represents the reaction 
functions of firm 1, as given by equations (14a) and (14b) and the curve )( 12 jAR
represents the reaction function of firm 2, as in (14c) and (14d).
2
 Given our presumption 
that jj AA 21  , the relevant range of solution values is the region below the 45
0
 line 
through the origin where )( 21 jAR is a steeply rising curve and )( 12 jAR is negatively 
sloped for most parts.
3
 
                                                 
1
 The calculation of the equilibrium values of A and q has been done with the help of Mathematica 4. 
2
 The reaction functions have been plotted using Scientific Workplace 3.0. 
3
 See Appendix B for the slopes of the reaction functions. 
  
 
Proposition 2: After trade liberalization, the two firms offer two distinct qualities at the 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Firm 1 offers a cleaner variety and Firm 2 offers a 
dirtier variety than under autarky. But each firm offers the same quality to the home and 
foreign consumers at the unregulated sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof: As shown in (13a) and (13b), the two firms produce two distinct qualities 
*
2
*
1  and jj AA but each firm offers the same environmental quality, 
*
2
*
1 ii AA  , to the two 
markets. Under autarky, with )2,1(    ii  , the environmental-quality offered was, 
 221 25.0 
aa AA  
Comparing this environmental-quality level with that offered by the two firms after trade 
liberalization, it is immediate that  
 2,1      
*
221
*
1  jAAAA j
aa
j .  
Figure 1: Equilibrium environmental qualities  
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Hence the result. 

 
 
Thus, one firm produces a dirtier variety and the other a relatively cleaner variety after 
trade liberalization, even when there is no cost advantage. This is the pro-competitive 
effect. The firms differentiate their products in order to relax the second stage (quantity) 
competition between them.
4
 On the other hand, the choice of identical qualities for the 
two markets (at the unregulated equilibrium) is due to the assumption of identical sets of 
consumers or market symmetry property of the model. Note that if the market sizes were 
different, the quality choice would differ as well. That is, if ,21    then 
2,1    *2
*
1  iAA ii . 
 
Let us now examine the effect of trade liberalisation on the pollution levels. The 
following Lemma is useful in this regard. 
 
Lemma 3: The scale of production and the extent of market coverage in the two countries 
increase after trade liberalization. 
 
Proof:  Combining (11a), (11c), (13a) and (13b), the scale of production of the two firms 
can be written as, 
 2*12
*
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*
1 9017.0  qqq     (14a) 
 2*22
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*
2 5492.0  qqq     (14b) 
Here,    
         
  are the domestic consumption of X in the two countries while 
   
         
  are their exports. Comparing these values with those given by (6b) for 
, i  it is immediate that, 
a
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Market covered in each country under autarky is 
25.0)
~
1(   aiq   (15) 
Whereas, the market covered in each country under free trade is, 
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2
*
12 7254.0)1(   jj qq .  (16) 
                                                 
4
 This result is well established in the literature on quality competition. See Shaked and Sutton (1982) and 
Motta (1993). 
Hence the claim.        
 
Lemma 3 implies that trade liberalization raises economic activity in both the countries 
and hence, the local pollution rises in both the countries due to the negative scale effect. 
While the technique effect merely reinforces the scale effect in country 2 where the firm 
specializes in the production of the dirtier variety, it offsets, at least partially, its negative 
impact in country 1. Whether local pollution rises or falls in country 1 depends on which 
of the two effects dominate.  
 
Proposition 3: With trade liberalization, the pollution level in Country 2 rises 
unambiguously and that in Country 1 rises too, unless the technique effect is strong 
enough to outweigh the scale effect.  
 
Proof:  In Country 2, both the technique and the scale effects have a negative impact on 
local pollution as the environmental-quality of X falls after trade liberalization and the 
production by firm 2 increases. So, the two effects reinforce each other. The local 
pollution in Country 1 rises due to the scale effect and is partially offset by the technique 
effect. The change in pollution can be formally written as, 
     jjjjjjj dAALdqqLdL   (17) 
So, the change in pollution in Country 1 is negative when 
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The change in pollution in Country 2 is, 
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where   
   
  
  
  
  is the scale effect and   
   
  
  
  
 is the technique effect in the two 
countries.  
Hence the claim.   
 
4. Environmental Policy  
 
Since the production of the dirty good X generates pollution, and in most cases this 
pollution increases with trade liberalization, the countries often adopt environmental 
policies like taxes and tariffs to control pollution. In this section, we study the impact of 
pollution content taxes and pollution content tariffs imposed by the two governments. 
 
4.1  Pollution Content Taxes 
 
In this subsection we consider the effect of an imposition of a pollution content tax on 
local production, that is, a tax that is inversely proportional to the environmental-quality 
of the dirty good. Such taxes will make the production of “dirty” goods more expensive, 
and encourage producers to opt for cleaner methods of production. Since there is a 
strategic interaction between the firms of the two countries, a tax levied on production 
will affect the environmental quality offered by the other firm as well. . This in turn will 
affect the scale of production, and hence, pollution in both countries.  
 
Suppose the local government in country 1 imposes a pollution content production tax on 
its local firm: 
  11
2
1
1 2)( AATAATT j
j


 (18) 
Since the tax is imposed only on local production in Country 1, firm 2 is not subject to it. 
With no import tariff imposed, the profit function of firm 2 remains the same as before. 
The profit function of firm 1 now becomes  
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Suppose the tax is imposed before the firms choose their environmental-qualities or 
quantities. That is, the firms make their decisions, given the tax rate. They choose ijq  by 
maximising 
j
ijij qp  as before. The profit function of firm 2 remains the same as before 
as it is not burdened with any tax. The stage 2 optimum choice of quantities and prices 
chosen by the two firms are the same as in (11a) and (11b).  
  
 
  
 Since the relative cost of the dirtier varieties increase with the pollution content tax, 
choice of environmental-quality will now differ. However, the quantities and 
environmental-qualities supplied by any firm in the two countries will still be identical as 
the two countries are symmetric. The first order conditions for profit maximisation, given 
the Nash equilibrium quantities 
*
ijq  and prices, now yields the following reaction 
functions of the two firms: 
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It is immediate that the reaction function of the firm 1 shifts to the right. Therefore, at the 
new equilibrium 4E , the quality levels chosen by firm 1 will rise while those chosen by 
firm 2 will fall. (See Figure 2).  
 
Lemma 4: The scale and technique effects work in opposite directions on the local 
pollution in both the countries when country 1 imposes a pollution content production 
tax.  
 
Proof: The change in the environmental-qualities chosen by the two firms for j=1,2 are: 
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The change in the quantities produced by the two firms is, then, 
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as 0    and   0 21  dAdA .   
 
Thus, in country 1, the local firm improves the environmental-quality of its products and 
raises the scale of production at the same time, as shown in equations (21a & 22a). Thus, 
the technique effect lowers the local pollution in that country while the scale effect 
offsets the benefits of the technique effect. The opposite is observed in country 2 where 
the environmental-quality of the goods produced and the total output produced falls.   
 
If, however, Country 2 imposes the pollution content production tax on the goods 
produced in that country, the reaction function of firm 2 shifts to the right, improving the 
environmental quality produced by both firms (see Figure 3). In this case,  
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Firm 1 then lowers its production while firm 2 raises its output level in order to maximise 
their profits. 
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Proposition 5: A pollution content production tax imposed by any one country will 
increase the exports and reduce imports by that country. 
 
Proof: As shown in equations (22a) and (24a), quantity produced by the firm in the 
country imposing the tax increases. That is, its production for domestic consumption, as 
well as exports increase. On the other hand, as shown in equations (22b) and (24b), 
quantity produced by the firm in the other country falls. So, the quantity imported by the 
country imposing the tax falls.   
 
Proposition 6: The pollution in both the countries will fall after Country 1 imposes a 
pollution content tax only if the technique effect | |  
 |  |
|  |
 | |  
 |  |
|  |
 . If the tax is 
imposed by Country 2 instead, the pollution in Country 1 will always fall while that in 
Country 2 will fall only when the technique effect is strong enough, i.e. | |  
 |  |
|  |
.   
 
Proof: The change in the level of pollution due to the tax in Country 1 is : 
  ̂  (    | |  ) ̂       where      
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As shown in Lemma 4,                and               .  
Thus,   ̂    when | |  
 |  |
|  |
  and   ̂    when | |  
 |  |
|  |
     
 
When Country 2 imposes the tax,                and              . 
So,   ̂    always while   ̂    when | |  
 |  |
|  |
   
 
4.2 Pollution Content Tariff: 
 
To examine whether a pollution content tariff has a different impact, suppose that the 
government in country 1 imposes a pollution content tariff on imports instead of the 
production tax. Let 1T  denote the import tariff. Then, 
 )( 211 AAT   (25) 
With no production tax, the reaction function of firm 1 will remain the same as in 
equation (12a &c) in the two countries. While the reaction function of firm 2 in its own 
country remains unaltered, its reaction function for its exports shifts to the right. The 
tariff-ridden reaction function is: 
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The reaction functions of the two firms in country 1 are represented in Figure 4 and are 
similar to the situation where the country 2 imposes production tax on firm 2. Thus, the 
quality of imports and local production in country 1 rises. Since there is no intervention 
in country 2, the two firms will continue to sell goods of quality *22
*
12  and AA , that is, the 
qualities they were offering at the unregulated free trade equilibrium. The change in the 
level of output supplied by the two firms in country 1 is the same as in the case of the 
production tax imposed by country 2 and can be expressed by (22a) and (22b), .1j  
As there is no intervention in country 2, there is no change in the environmental-quality 
supplied by the two firms to the consumers and hence, in the market coverage in that 
country will remain the same. As shown in Proposition 5, the local pollution in Country 1 
will fall, though the change will be less than that in the case of production tax by country 
2 as the environmental-quality of the two firms had improved in both the countries in that 
case. 
 
If the government of country 2 imposes the pollution content tariff on its imports, then 
the reaction function of firm 1 for its exports will shift to the right. The tariff ridden 
reaction function is, 
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Since the local production is not affected by the import tariff, the reaction function of 
firm 2 remains as in equation (12d). Thus, the effect of the pollution content tariff by 
country 2 is similar to that of the production tax imposed by country 1 and at the new 
equilibrium the quality of imports from firm 1 rises while that of the local production by 
firm 2 falls (Figure 3). The quantity sold by firm 1 increases and that sold by firm 2 falls, 
as shown in equations (24a & b). Again, since the market in country 1 remains unaffected 
by the tariff imposed on imports in country 2, the environmental qualities offered by the 
two firms will remain *21
*
11  and AA  and quantities will also remain unaltered.   
 
 
6. Conclusion 
  
This paper shows that intra-industry trade in dirty good increases the scale of production 
pollution in both countries. As there are strategic interactions between the two firms in 
the two countries, they produce two distinct qualities to relax competition. While the firm 
in one country improves the environmental quality of its product, the other firm reduces 
it.  The greater production activity caused by the pro-competitive effect of trade is the 
main source of such greater environmental damages. A pollution content production tax 
raises the level of exports and lowers the imports in the country it is imposed. While a tax 
imposed by the country producing the lower-quality good always lowers the pollution in 
the other country, in all other cases, that is the impact of tax by country producing higher 
quality on the pollution levels in both countries and the tax in the low-quality country on 
the pollution there, depends on the relative importance of the scale and technique effects.   
 
Appendix A 
 
The Nash equilibrium choice of environmental-quality of the two firms under free trade: 
 
From equations (13a) through (13d), we get the Nash equilibrium pair of quantities and 
the corresponding market clearing prices as, 
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The profit functions of the two firms is then, 
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Setting ,0


ij
i
A
 we get the first order conditions of profit maximisation as (14a) 
through (3.14d). Setting jij AA 2 , we can rewrite the reaction functions as, 
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Substituting (A.4b) in (A.4a) we get, 
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Solving for  , we get two solutions for equation (A.5),  7924.2  ,67042.0 . As we 
have assumed that 1 , the second solution is the relevant one. Substituting 7924.2
in the reaction functions we get the Nash equilibrium qualities as: 
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Appendix B 
 
The slopes of the reaction functions of the two firms in each country are: 
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